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Abstract: F. H .  Jacobi (1743- 1819) ,  a key figure in the philosophical debates at 
the close of the eighteenth century in Germany, has long been regarded as an 
irrationalist for allegedly advocating a blind ‘leap of faith’. The central claim of this 
essay is that this venerable charge is misplaced. Following a reconstruction of what 
a charge of irrationalism might amount to, two of Jacobi’s most important works, 
the Spinoza Letters (1785) and Da vid H um e  (1787) ,  are scrutinized for traces of 
irrationalism. Far from being an irrationalist, Jacobi is best read as questioning the 
analytical-geometrical model of rationality popular among his contemporaries, and 
of proposing a more naturalistic theory of rationality that situates it more firmly in 
human psychology, the ultimate import of which lies in a reconceptualization of the 
relation between faith and reason.
Pantheism is the clandestine religion of Germany, as was predicted fifty years ago by 
those German writers who campaigned so intensively against Spinoza. The fiercest of 
these opponents of Spinoza was Fr. Heinr. Jacobi, who is occasionally honoured by 
being named among the German philosophers. He was nothing but a quarrelsome 
sneak, who, disguising himself in a philosopher’s cloak, made his way in among the 
philosophers, first whimpering to them about his love and his tender soul, and then 
letting loose against reason. His refrain always went: philosophy, knowledge through 
reason, is a vain delusion; reason does not even itself know where it leads; it brings 
one into a dark labyrinth of error and contradiction; and only faith can lead one 
securely. That mole! He did not see that reason is like the eternal sun, which, as it 
makes its steady way above, illuminates its own path with its own light. Nothing 
compares to the pious, smug hatred little Jacobi harboured for the great Spinoza.1
These famous lines from the sardonic pen of Heinrich Heine more or less capture 
the widely held judgem ent of posterity on F. H. Jacobi (1743- 1819), one of the more 
enigmatic products of late eighteenth-century German letters. The essence of the 
charge, buried in Heine’s bombast, is that Jacobi is an irrationalist. Heine was by 
no m eans the first to suggest as much. Moses Mendelssohn, with whom Jacobi
309
310 BENJAMIN D. CROWE
initiated a famous exchange of letters that eventually culminated in the so-called 
‘Spinoza d ispute’, also charges Jacobi with advocating irrationality and ‘blind 
faith’, albeit indirectly.2 Likewise Kant, in his contribution to this im portant de­
bate, suggests that Jacobi ‘ overturns reason ’ by holding that belief in God can be 
based on an ‘ intuition ’ prior to all rational investigation.3
The younger generation of literati was by no m eans to be outdone in casting 
aspersions upon Jacobi. In his review of a later edition of Jacobi’s novel 
Woldemar, Friedrich Schlegel asserts that Jacobi ‘hates philosophical reason’, 
and that his ‘positive theory of faith simply cannot be taken to be philosophical’.4 
More recently, scholars have begun to take Jacobi more seriously as an im portant 
player in the formation of post-Kantian German philosophy.5 Still, Frederick C. 
Beiser, in his rightly respected discussion of this period, argues that Jacobi 
advocates a ‘leap of faith’ and that M endelssohn’s judgem ent of Jacobi as ‘just 
another Schwarmer, another pietistic mystic who wanted to debunk reason and 
to convert him  to an irrational form of Christianity’ has some ring of truth to it.6 
On Beiser’s reading, Jacobi presented his contemporaries with the following 
dilemma:
... e ither w e follow our reason  and  becom e atheists and  fatalists; or w e renounce  our 
reason  and  m ake a leap of faith in God and  freedom . In m ore general term s, we have to 
choose e ither a rational skepticism  or an  irrational faith. There is sim ply no  com forting 
m iddle p a th  betw een these  options, no  way to  justify m orality  and  religion through 
reaso n .7
Other historians of the period tend to be more nuanced in their judgem ents of 
Jacobi. For example, in his magisterial history of German idealism, Terry Pinkard 
acknowledges that the traditional reading of Jacobi is a caricature, and that Jacobi 
belongs to a long tradition of philosophers who, while sceptical of claims made 
on behalf of reason, could hardly be called irrationalists.8 More than anyone else, 
however, George di Giovanni has argued passionately for a radical reassessment 
of Jacobi’s position. Di Giovanni maintains that Jacobi ‘never intended to foster 
irrationalism ’.9 I think that Pinkard and di Giovanni are correct in advocating 
a revision of the traditional view of Jacobi. In the present essay, my aim is to 
contribute to the cause by filling in some of the details left out by Jacobi’s modern 
advocates. In so doing, my primary focus is on the implications of Jacobi’s 
position for the epistemology of religious belief.
My argument proceeds as follows. First, I offer a plausible account of what a 
charge of ‘irrationalism ’ might really am ount to. In the remainder of my dis­
cussion, I measure Jacobi’s position in two of his most im portant and influential 
works -  Concerning the Doctrine o f  Spinoza in Letters to Herr Moses Mendelssohn 
(1785) and D avid Hume on Faith, or Idealism an d  Realism, A Dialogue (1787) -  
against this conception of irrationalism.101 argue that Jacobi does not have what it 
takes to be considered an irrationalist, at least by this plausible account of what 
irrationalism means. Instead, Jacobi is guilty only of questioning, and proposing
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an alternative to, a paradigm of rationality on which ‘reason’ just m eans de­
ductive or ‘analytic’ patterns of inference. In place of this paradigm, Jacobi offers 
a more naturalistic theory of rationality that situates it more firmly in hum an 
psychology, and he does so in order to articulate a new understanding of the 
relation between faith and reason.
W h at i t  ta k e s  to  b e  a n  i r r a t io n a l is t
‘Irrationalism ’ functions in most philosophical discourse more as a blunt 
instrum ent than as a finely tooled one. As one might expect, it is difficult to spell 
out any precise view that goes by this name. However, there are a few general 
associations attached to the term  that more or less fix the boundaries of its 
application. I do not pretend here to be giving an exhaustive account of these 
associations, but only to delineate those that might be relevant to the traditional 
labelling of Jacobi as an irrationalist.
‘Irrationalism ’ often connotes a tendency toward or advocacy of arbitrariness 
in one’s beliefs and decisions. The thought is that an irrationalist is someone who 
simply plum ps for a particular belief or course of action without considering 
reasons for or against it. An irrationalist is a person prone to ‘ leaps ’ rather than to 
inferences. As in the passage quoted above from Beiser, this seems to be part of 
the com m on reading of Jacobi. The famous salto m ortale that he recom m ends to 
Lessing during their reported conversation is typically taken to be a ‘leap of faith’. 
Another idea closely associated with arbitrariness is that ‘irrationalism ’ is a view 
that substitutes private whim or wishful thinking for rational conviction. That is, 
an irrationalist cares more about what she wants to be true than what reason 
might warrant.
Irrationalism also suggests a sort of denigration of reason. The idea is that the 
deliverances of reason are irrelevant, immaterial, or worthless. Put in religious 
terms, the thought is that hum an reason is limited and corrupt and so has no 
rights over divine revelation. Allied with this denigration of reason is an aversion 
to critical enquiry, particularly when it is directed at one’s cherished beliefs. This 
is often joined with a kind of counter-evidentialism. Counter-evidentialism goes 
beyond the claim that some beliefs or courses of action can be justified even 
when evidence is weak or absent to endorse the claim that they can justified even 
if the evidence against them  is overwhelming. Another version of this counsels 
the adoption of beliefs or courses of action that are manifestly incoherent. This is 
captured by the famous m isquote from Tertullian, credo quia absurdum .11
My primary contention in the present essay is that none of these senses of 
irrationalism can be applied to Jacobi’s stated views in the Spinoza Letters and 
D avid Hume. In defending this claim, I also have occasion to spell out Jacobi’s 
position on the nature of religious com m itm ent and on its relation to reason.
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Before exploring Jacobi’s texts, a brief word is in order regarding the dif­
ficulty of reading them. Much of the blame for Jacobi’s reputation as an ob­
scurantist mystic and enemy of reason must ultimately be placed on his own 
shoulders. The two primary philosophical works that I discuss here, the Spinoza  
Letters and D avid Hume, can hardly be called systematic philosophical treatises. 
Particularly in the former, Jacobi leaps from argument to argument, intimation 
to intimation, often without developing his ideas beyond the most cursory of 
treatments. The D avid Hume is a dialogue, and so has a clearer argumentative 
trajectory to it, but it, too, has its obscurities.
The experience of reading Jacobi is perhaps best likened to listening to certain 
musical compositions. Rather than tracing out a lockstep progression of ideas, 
one follows along as best one can while themes are introduced and arguments 
developed, only to be dropped abruptly. At the same time, there is a sort of pro­
gressive clarification and illumination, so that, once one has come to the end, a 
fairly clear set of ideas has come into relief, and one possesses a much better 
grasp of how each piece fits into a coherent whole. In light of these qualities of his 
work, I have adopted the following approach to exposition. First, I treat the two 
texts, the Spinoza Letters and D avid Hume, separately, in order to trace out the 
development of the argument internal to each. Second, I have been selective in 
the passages that I have chosen to explain, not out of desire to avoid passages that 
might present difficulties for my interpretation, but rather in order to bring out 
the central phases of the respective arguments most vividly. Finally, at the con­
clusion of each section, I reiterate the substance of these various phases and 
describe how they form a coherent view.
T h e  S p in o z a  L e t te r s
The first phase of Jacobi’s argument in this justly famous text is ostensibly 
concerned with the limits of explanation. Jacobi announces that ‘I love Spinoza, 
because he, more than any other philosopher, has led me to the perfect conviction 
that certain things admit of no explication: one must not therefore keep one’s eyes 
shut to them, but must take them as one finds them ’ (MPW , 193). In particular, 
Jacobi has in mind our sense of ourselves as moral agents who posit ends and act 
for the sake of them. Spinoza, of course, famously argues that this sense, founded 
as it is on a notion of free or self-determining agency, is illusory. In Spinoza’s 
universe, everything is necessary. The problem, as Jacobi sees it, is that Spinoza 
transgresses the boundaries of his own system when, in parts 4 and 5 of the Ethics, 
he turns to sketching an ideal of human conduct. Jacobi puts it this way:
Spinoza also had to wriggle quite a bit to hide his fatalism when he turned to human
conduct, especially in his fourth and fifth parts [of the Ethics] where I could say that he
Interpreting Jacobi
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degrades him self to  a  sophist here an d  there. -  And th a t’s exactly w hat I w as saying: 
even th e  greatest m ind, if it w an ts to explain all th ings absolutely, to  m ake th em  
rhym e w ith each o th er according to  d istinct concep ts an d  will n o t o therw ise let 
anything stand, m u st ru n  into absurdities. (M P W , 194)
For Jacobi, the recognition that rational explanation runs aground on hum an 
agency is a liberating discovery. With this recognition one ‘gains the greatest 
room within oneself for genuine hum an tru th ’ (MPW, 194). What, then, is Jacobi 
after in these remarks? His claim is that our rationality, as modelled by Spinoza’s 
geometric method, is in fact conditioned by factors outside it. To reason properly 
about morality, one m ust begin with our sense of ourselves as personal agents. 
Abstract systems, such as the one devised by Spinoza, fail precisely at this point to 
the extent that they have abstracted away from this sense of agency.12 The im ­
personal, impartial, general nature of a system like Spinoza’s makes it difficult to 
see how someone would actually be m otivated  to adopt the course of life that he 
recommends. There must be something outside the abstract system that lends 
it urgency and import, and, Jacobi suggests, that thing is our concrete sense of 
moral agency. The problem, however, is that Spinoza’s system cannot make sense 
of the one thing that gives it urgency and import.
At this point, the charge of irrationalism becomes explicit in Jacobi’s reported 
conversation with Lessing. Lessing’s worry is that, by making something outside 
the rational system explanatorily prior to the conclusions of the system itself, 
Jacobi is advocating an arbitrary leap of faith. This is how Jacobi reports the 
exchange:
Lessing: W ords, dear Jacobi, w ords! The boundary  [betw een th e  com prehensib le  and  the  
incom prehensible] th a t you w an t to establish does n o t allow of determ ination . And 
m oreover, you give free play to phan tasies, nonsense, obscurantism . [Jacobi]: I believe 
th a t th a t b o undary  can  be defined. I have no in ten tio n  of es ta b lish in g  a  boundary, bu t 
only of finding one th a t is already established and  leaving it in place. And as for 
nonsense, phan tasies, obscu ran tism  . . . .  Lessing: These are to be  found  w herever 
confused concepts rule. [Jacobi]: And even m ore w here f ic t i t io u s  concep ts do. Even 
th e  b lindest, m ost nonsensical faith, if n o t th e  stupidest, finds its high th ro n e  there.
For once one has fallen in  love w ith certa in  explanations, one accep ts blindly every 
consequence th a t can  be  draw n from  a n  inference th a t one can n o t invalidate -  even 
if one m u st walk on  o n e ’s head. {MPW, 194)
In essence, Jacobi’s response is that, by recognizing extra-rational constraints 
or conditions on rationality, he is in no way licensing absurdity. Instead, absurd­
ity results when a person substitutes the purely formal dem ands of the rational 
system for, in this case, our sense of moral agency.
This is the import of Jacobi’s infamous salto mortale, which, contrary to the 
com m on view, does not refer to a ‘leap of faith’ at all, but rather to a kind of 
somersault perfected by Italian circus performers. To privilege formal demands 
over the conditions that give them  substance is to get things backward or upside 
down. The salto m ortale is not a blind leap of faith in favour of some arbitrary,
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if cherished view. Instead, it is a return to normality. In this instance, this requires 
a recognition that our sense of moral agency is what gives definition to the pat­
terns of inference that constitute the system. But if the sense of moral agency is 
eliminated because of the formal demands of the system, then the system loses 
any connection with what Jacobi calls ‘genuine human truth’. Jacobi makes 
much the same point when, at a later point in the text, he avers that ‘What I have 
stood and shall stand for, however, is not Spinoza and his system; it is rather the 
dictum of Pascal: La nature confound les Pyrrhoniens, & la raison les Dogmatistes ’ 
(.MPW , 204). The particularly crucial part of this quotation is the first, ‘nature 
contradicts the Pyrrhonists’. Scepticism, like Spinozistic determinism, is the re­
sult of an insistence on the formal demands of the system at the expense of the 
actual condition of human beings in the real world.13
Jacobi is not merely saying that we ought to stick to our cherished convictions 
even when they disagree with the best deliverances of reason. Traditionally, this 
has been regarded as the sum total of his contribution to the philosophical de­
bates of his era. In actuality, his point is considerably more subtle. Why, Jacobi 
asks, do we care about the rationality of our moral judgements or about the 
achievement of certainty in the first place? The answer cannot lie in the system­
atic, formal reflections that proceed only on the basis of the antecedent concern 
in question. Instead, moral theory (to stick to Jacobi’s main example here) is 
anchored in a non-theoretical sense or sentiment of our own agency. The prob­
lem is not so much that philosophical theories undermine our cherished beliefs, 
but that they undermine themselves by becoming detached from what motivates 
the philosophical enterprise in the first place. Somewhere along the way this 
anchoring motivation has been forgotten or replaced by some formal demands 
that are internal to the reflective system.
As the discussion proceeds, Jacobi expands upon this basic line of argument 
with a regress argument. He famously writes:
My dear Mendelssohn, we are all born in the faith, and we must remain in the faith, 
just as we are all born in society, and must remain in society: Totum parte prius esse 
necesse est. -  How can we strive for certainty unless we are already acquainted with 
certainty in advance, and how can we be acquainted with it except through something 
that we already discern with certainty? .... Conviction by proofs is certainty at second
hand...... But if every assent to truth not derived from rational grounds is faith, then
conviction based on rational grounds must itself derive from faith and must receive 
its force from faith alone. {MPW, 230)
Here, Jacobi is making a point familiar to foundationalists, but with an important 
twist. Foundationalism is typically motivated by a concern with the so-called 
‘basing relation ’ between propositions. On this view, propositions are justified by 
other propositions on which the former are ‘based’. This leads to a potential 
regress, which can only be halted if there are some primary or ‘ properly basic ’ 
propositions that provide the bases for all the others.
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Jacobi’s point is clearly parallel to this familiar line of reasoning. His claim is 
that a philosophical system, such as Spinoza’s, is a pattern of inferential relations 
between propositions. But why, he wonders, accept the assumptions that com ­
prise the bases for this pattern? By itself, no such pattern is self-warranting. To 
hold that a particular pattern (say, Spinoza’s theory) is self-warranting is, once 
more, to confuse formal dem ands that obtain of relations between propositions 
with the extra-rational conditions that make it possible both to (1) accept the 
basic com m itm ents that motivate the system, and (2) to see the force of the 
inferential connections that link its constituent propositions. Jacobi’s name for 
the extra-rational conditions that anchor a system of relations between prop­
ositions is faith. ‘Through faith’, he asserts, ‘we know that we have a body, 
and that there are other bodies and other thinking beings outside u s ’ (MPW, 231). 
Driving hom e his point about the im portance of these conditions, he tells 
Mendelssohn that ‘We obtain all representations, therefore, sim ply through 
modifications that we acquire; there is no other way to real cognition, for wher­
ever reason gives birth to objects, they are all just chim eras’ (MPW, 231).
How does this general view relate to the epistemology of religion? First of all, 
Jacobi contends that rational demonstrations of God’s existence simply explicate 
the relations between propositions. They do not, thereby, compel anyone to ac­
cept the initial propositions. Instead, a particular extra-rational factor, which 
Jacobi describes as a modification of our sense of moral agency, does the im ­
portant work of anchoring them. Paraphrasing the Dutch Platonist Hemsterhuis, 
with whom Jacobi also corresponded extensively, he asserts that ‘the occasional 
occurrence in the soul of even one aspiration for the better, for the future and the 
perfect, is a better proof of the Divinity than any geometric proof’ (MPW, 214). He 
goes on to quote Plato and Hemsterhuis to this effect:
You know what Plato wrote to Dion’s friends: ‘ For regarding divine things, there is no 
way of putting the subject into words like other studies. Acquaintance with it must come 
rather after a long period of attendance to instruction in the subject itself and of close 
companionship with it, when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is 
generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining. ’ You say almost the same 
thing in the Aristee, namely, ‘that the conviction of the feeling from which all other 
convictions are derived, is bom within the very essence, and cannot be communicated. ’ 
But must not the feeling that lies at the ground of this conviction be found in all men, 
and should it not be possible to liberate it to some extent in those who appear to be 
destitute of it, by working to remove the hindrances that inhibit its effective action? 
{MPW, 214)
The import of both the paraphrase of Hemsterhuis quoted above, and the 
longer passage on both Plato and Hemsterhuis, is that religious conviction is 
grounded in a kind of moral sentim ent or ‘aspiration’ as Jacobi calls it. Such a 
sentim ent or aspiration is the sort of thing that requires immediate acquaintance. 
It can hardly be captured, m uch less exhausted, by a system of formal relations 
between propositions. Importantly, Jacobi also insists that this sentim ent is in no
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way private or idiosyncratic. Individual whim or caprice are not being offered 
here as substitutes for genuine rational conviction. Instead, Jacobi is appealing to 
what he takes to be a more or less universal sense of ourselves as moral agents 
who are called upon to pursue a ‘higher’ purpose .14 There are striking parallels 
between what Jacobi has to say here and John Henry Newman’s discussion, al­
m ost a century later, about how people form a ‘ real apprehension’ of the being of 
God.15 Newman argues that the conscience, the sense of a ‘sanction’ involved in 
feelings attended on the apprehension of our own conduct is the psychological 
foundation of religious conviction. This sense may be more or less developed or 
articulate, but it can hardly be said to be an idiosyncratic part of the psychological 
m ake-up of some small minority of people.
Jacobi expands upon his basic point a bit later in the exchange with 
Mendelssohn. He writes that ‘ The religion of the Christians instructs m an how to 
take on qualities through which he can make progress in his existence and propel 
himself to a higher life -  and with this life to a higher consciousness, in this 
consciousness to a higher cognition’ (MPW, 231). Or again, he argues that ‘Man 
becomes aware of God through a godly life, and there is a peace of God which is 
higher than all reason; in this peace there is the enjoyment and the intuition of an 
inconceivable love’ (MPW, 231). What Jacobi is describing here is how religious 
conviction and com m itm ent come about, and how they operate subsequently 
within a person’s psychology. There is no suggestion here that one is convinced 
of the truth of Christianity by some formal demonstration. Instead, conviction 
begins with the moral sentim ent described above. Through practice, this is de­
veloped, deepened, strengthened, and cultivated. This process brings with it a 
growing insight into the being of God and an ever-strengthening conviction re­
garding the religious system that articulates this insight.
Does reason play a role in this process? Jacobi does not say. Nothing that he 
says here, however, precludes the possibility that it does. One m ust wait for 
his D avid Hume to see more precisely how Jacobi understands the relationship 
between rationality and the extra-rational factors, e.g. this moral sentiment, that 
condition it. Still, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that, on the picture pres­
ented by Jacobi here in the Spinoza Letters, the deepening and cultivation of the 
moral sentim ent goes hand in hand with a cultivation and deepening of one’s 
facility in reasoning about morality and religion. Rationality can be viewed here 
as a facility in judgem ent that is conditioned and enabled by extra-rational fac­
tors. Jacobi insists that the development of religious conviction leads to a ‘peace’ 
and ‘intuition’ that is ‘higher than reason’. There is nothing here to suggest that 
religious conviction is contrary to reason. Instead, Jacobi is merely insisting that 
religious conviction and com m itm ent cannot be reduced to holding certain 
propositions on rational grounds. Of course, Jacobi is attaching a rather large 
promissory note to his position. As he puts it later, ‘ Try to grow in virtue perfectly, 
that is, to exercise it purely and incessantly. Either you desist in the attempt, or
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you’ll become aware of God in yourself, just as you are aware of yourself’ {MPW, 
243).
Jacobi acknowledges that, to someone (like Mendelssohn, apparently) who is in 
the grip of a certain view of rationality, all of this will seem unintelligible or worse. 
But, he concludes picturesquely, so m uch the worse for people who are in the grip 
of this view:
Reason th a t has fallen in to  poverty an d  has becom e speculative, o r in  o ther words, 
d egenera te  reason, can  n e ither com m end  no r to lerate th is practical path . It has ne ither 
h an d  n o r foot for digging, yet it is too  proud  to  beg. H ence it m u st drag itself here and 
there, looking for a  tru th  th a t left w hen  th e  contem plative un d erstan d in g  left, for religion 
and  its goods -  ju s t as m orality  m u st do, looking for v irtuous inclinations th a t have 
d isappeared ; an d  laws m ust also, looking for th e  fallen public  sp irit an d  th e  bette r 
custom s, pedagogy . . . .  {MPW, 232)
Here, the claim is that a formal system cannot substitute for the vital conviction 
and facility of judgem ent that actual hum an dispositions and sentiments make 
possible. When these are lost, one is left with a mere system. The right move to 
make, according to Jacobi, is not to jettison the complex dispositions and senti­
m ents that condition our rationality, but to reform our picture of what rationality 
is and how it operates. He w rites:
We do n o t create or instruct ourselves; we are in  no  way a  priori, nor can  we know or 
do any th ing  a  priori, or experience anything w ith o u t ... experience. We find ourselves 
situated  on  th is earth , an d  as our actions becom e there, so too  becom es our cognition; 
as our m oral characte r tu rn s ou t to  be, so too  does our insight in to  all things related  to 
it. As the  heart, so too  th e  m ind ; an d  as the  m ind, so too  th e  heart. M an can n o t artificially 
contrive th rough  reason  to  be wise, virtuous, or p ious: he  m u st be  m o v e d  to  it, an d  yet 
m o v e  him self; he m u st be  organically d isposed to  it, yet so d ispose  himself. {M PW , 237)
While this passage is not without its obscurities, it more or less captures 
Jacobi’s revised view of hum an rationality. This view is m uch more thoroughly 
developed in the D avid Hume, as will become clear below. His basic position is 
that reason, regarded as the ability to discern formal relations between possible 
propositions, is both practically and  theoretically inert on its own. Rationality 
m ust be ‘anim ated’, as it were, by a variety of extra-rational conditions. These 
conditions are not adventitious or idiosyncratic, but instead are deep features of 
our cognitive make-up. To ignore these features of our m ental structure is, for 
Jacobi, to court absurdity. Is there anything ‘irrationalist’ about this position? 
Jacobi explicitly denies Lessing’s charge that he is advocating nonsense. We 
should take this denial at face value. Jacobi is making no commitment, either 
explicit or implicit, to the propriety of relying on arbitrary whim in forming beliefs 
or practical judgements. Nor is there any hint that it is acceptable to believe 
in incoherent bodies of propositions. Religious commitment, on this view, hardly 
rests upon a blind ‘leap of faith’. Instead, it is Jacobi’s primary example of 
rationality, as it really exists, in action.
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D a v id  H u m e  o n  F a ith
Partly as a result of the furore caused by Jacobi’s public debate with 
M endelssohn regarding Lessing’s alleged Spinozism, Jacobi published in 1787 a 
further statem ent and clarification of his basic position, D avid Hume on Faith, 
or Idealism and Realism, a  Dialogue. As he had done quite briefly, and hardly 
to the satisfaction of all interested parties, in the Spinoza Letters, Jacobi considers 
here the charge that he is advocating ‘blind faith’. He defends himself by first 
of all reiterating and expanding his view about the extra-rational conditions of 
reason. Second, he rejects a analytic-geometrical paradigm of reason, according 
to which only deductive inference provides the kind of support needed for 
philosophical and religious claims. On this paradigm, everything that falls short 
of the canons of strict deductive inference is inferior or second-rate. Thus, 
in defending ‘faith’ Jacobi seems to be advocating something less than genuine 
rationality.
Jacobi broaches this topic quite directly in the preface to this work. He writes:
The unusual use that I made of the word ‘ faith ’ in the Letters concerning Spinoza  refers 
to a need that is not mine, but a philosophy’s that claims that rational knowledge does 
not deal just in relations, but extends to the very existence of things and their 
properties -  so much so that knowledge o f  actual existence through reason would have an 
apodeictic certainty not ever to be ascribed to sensory knowledge. According to this 
philosophy there is a twofold knowledge of actual existence, one certain and the other 
uncertain. This latter, [as] I said [in the Letters concerning Sp inoza], should be called 
‘ faith. ’ For the assumption was that every cognition th a t does n o t originate in rational 
sources is ‘faith’. [MPW, 255- 256).
Here, Jacobi introduces the analytic-geometrical paradigm. On this view, all 
legitimate knowledge, not just the knowledge of formal relations between prop­
ositions, m ust rest upon demonstrative inference. Only such knowledge is en­
titled to be called ‘certain’.
On this paradigm, there is another putative form of knowledge, which turns out 
not to be real knowledge at all. This is ‘faith’, an uncertain, imperfect assent to 
propositions in the apparent absence of strict deductive inferences to warrant the 
assent. Jacobi continues:
My philosophy does not hold any such duality in the knowledge of actual existence.
It claims but a single knowledge through sensation, and it restricts reason, considered 
by itself, to the mere faculty of perceiving relations clearly, i.e. to the power of 
fo rm u la tin g  the principle o f  identity  a n d  o f  ju d g in g  in conform ity to it. With this claim, 
however, I am forced to admit that only the assertion of identical propositions is 
apodeictic and carries absolute certainty, and that any assertion of the existence of a 
thing in itself outside my representation, can never be of this kind or carry absolute 
certainty with it. So an idealist, basing himself on this distinction, can compel me to 
concede that my conviction about the existence of real things outside me is only a 
matter of fa ith . But then, as a realist, I am forced to say that all knowledge derives 
exclusively from faith, for things must be given to me before I am in a position to 
enquire about relations. [MPW, 256)
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Jacobi here rejects the analytic-geometrical paradigm altogether. According to 
Jacobi, reason is nothing more than the faculty of discerning relations between 
propositions, of deriving formal dem ands or rules from these relations, and of 
applying the rules in question. Taken by itself, in isolation from other features of 
our m ental economy, reason can at best yield analytic or conceptual truths. It can 
tell us nothing, however, about actuality.
Jacobi’s point here anticipates one made more recently by Gilbert Harman. 
Reason presents a rule, namely, that from p  and ‘if p  then q ’, one should infer q. 
As Harman points out, this automatically tells us that we m ust accept q. Perhaps 
p  is unacceptable, or perhaps ‘if p  then q ’ should be denied .16 Or consider an 
example somewhat closer to Jacobi’s immediate concern in the D avid Hume, i.e. 
the so-called epistemic closure principle: ‘If, while knowing p, S believes q  be­
cause S knows that p  entails q, then S knows q. ’ Filling in the formal structure, 
one can restate the principle in the following form: ‘If, while knowing that she has 
hands, S believes she is not a brain in a va t because S knows that I have hands 
entails I am  not a brain in a vat, then S knows that she is not a brain in a vat. ’ But 
then the sceptic, or ‘idealist’ as Jacobi would call her, can point out that our 
unfortunate S does not, in fact, know that she is not a brain in a vat. As Jacobi puts 
it, ‘ So an idealist, basing himself on this distinction, can compel me to concede 
that my conviction about the existence of real things outside me is only a m atter 
of faith. ’ Jacobi m aintains that there is nothing about the formal rule captured by 
the epistemic closure principle that ought to com pel a person to accept the 
sceptic’s argument. Instead, it seems reasonable enough to hold that, at least in 
this case, the closure principle fails.
What Jacobi is doing is, in effect, rejecting a paradigm of rationality that was 
common coin in early m odern philosophy. On this view, there is a distinction 
between knowledge in the strict sense and some lesser breed of cognition. Jacobi 
is reiterating his view from the Spinoza Letters that (1) certainty derives from 
immediacy, and that (2) demonstrations are only as certain as the immediate 
intuitions that ground them. Our belief in the external world is this sort of 
immediate intuition. That it cannot be dem onstrated is of no consequence, since 
it is precisely the sort of thing that is assum ed in our demonstrations. Since 
Jacobi does not accept the view that takes anything short of deductively 
licensed conclusions as somehow epistemically inferior, he is not therefore ad­
vocating a reliance on bad reasoning or groundless assum ption when he appeals 
to faith.
This becomes clear again later on in the dialogue, when Jacobi returns ex­
plicitly to the charge that he is ‘ teaching blind faith and degrading reason ’ (MPW, 
262). Jacobi defines such ‘blind faith’ as ‘assent based on outward appearances, 
without reason or genuine insight’ (MPW, 262). He then refers to a recent pol­
emical pam phlet issuing from the Berlin Enlightenment circle, where ‘ blind faith ’ 
is taken to mean ‘ [a]ny assent, any affirmation, that does not rest on rational
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grounds’ {MPW, 263- 264). Deftly deploying Hum ean scepticism (hence the 
title of the work), Jacobi argues that, on this definition of ‘blind faith’, our 
ordinary knowledge of the external world, other minds, and our own continued 
existence over time become m atters of ‘blind faith’. The suggestion is that, if this 
is the consequence of a particular view of rationality, then there is a serious 
problem  with that view. Hence, Jacobi can reject the very terms on which he has 
been charged with advocating ‘blind faith’ in this sense. Once he makes this 
move, it can be seen quite clearly that Jacobi nowhere advocates ‘blind faith’ in 
the remaining sense of unreflective, uncritical assent to whatever happens to 
come one’s way.
In the remainder of the D avid Hume, Jacobi sets about dismantling the picture 
of hum an rationality that, as he sees it, motivates the charge that he is counselling 
an irrational, blind faith. In essence, Jacobi’s argument is that the rationalist 
picture of hum an reason rests upon a faulty, dichotomous picture of hum an 
nature as a whole. On this picture, reason is somehow detached from its real- 
world ‘hom e’ in our organic nature .17 When reason is understood properly, i.e. 
naturalistically, the identification of legitimate reasoning with abstract deductive 
inference begins to lose its appeal. The first move that Jacobi makes in this 
direction is to point out that the notion of ‘pure reason’ is an  abstraction that is 
formed, like all abstractions, by emptying a concrete idea of its content. ‘Just 
empty out your consciousness of all facts, of anything actually objective’, he 
counsels, ‘You’ll then be left with just your pure reason, and you’ll be able to 
question it without witnesses about all its secrets’ (MPW, 300). Pure reason is 
thus not some actual reason, but an abstraction. Jacobi’s suggestion, as the dia­
logue proceeds, is to stop short of this full abstraction in constructing a proper 
theory of hum an rationality.
In a brief discussion that is obscure even by Jacobi’s standards, he constructs a 
naturalistic theory of reason, the upshot of which is that reason is necessarily 
bound to sensibility (MPW, 300- 303). Paraphrasing Thomas Reid’s reliance on 
‘ordinary language’ in uncovering basic principles, Jacobi points out that, in 
German anyway, ‘We derive from Sinn (“ sense”) the most characteristic forms of 
understanding, as well as of the lack of i t ’ (MPW, 303). He approvingly quotes 
Leibniz on the continuum, arguing that there is a coherent chain that causally 
links brute matter, via organic life, to hum an rationality, without any breaks or 
interruptions (MPW, 307- 308).
Jacobi’s conclusion from this sketchy naturalistic account of rationality is that 
we need a substantive, less formalistic conception of reason, one that takes into 
account its organic context and the psychological conditions that anchor its 
operation (MPW, 319). Deliberately mocking the ideals of the Enlightenment, 
Jacobi avers that our reason is not a ‘light’, but rather an ‘eye’ (MPW, 319). 
‘ Surely’, he writes, ‘ the keen and serious observer cannot fail to notice that all our 
cognition is based on positivity, and the m om ent we abandon the latter, we end
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up in dreams and empty fictions’ (MPW, 320). Reason, Jacobi argues, is merely a 
refinement of our organic powers of sensation or perception.
The implication is that the proponents of the analytic-geometrical paradigm of 
reason, by discounting both sensible cognition and informal, probabilistic styles 
of reasoning, are committed to the fiction of a reason that exists apart from its 
precursors and conditions in our organic nature. Worse still, this com m itm ent 
generates a faulty view of what it is worthwhile to pursue. The Enlightenment, 
after all, was more than just a theory of rationality, it was a social programme. 
Society should be rationalized, it was thought, along the lines suggested by the 
great advances in m athem atics and physical science in the seventeenth century. 
Jacobi’s worry, however, is that the faulty picture of reason em braced by his 
opponents allows for only a thin, relatively formal set of policy recommendations 
for the em endation and improvement of hum an life. Jacobi dramatizes this worry 
in an interesting part of the dialogue:
He: ... . According to the  oldest testim onies, and  so too according to the  m ost 
profound  philosophy, our finite being  m u st begin w ith th e  body and  be constantly  
supported  by it. H ence our reason  m u st begin  w ith sense-im pression , and  be 
constan tly  supported  by it. Our natural cognition can  never rise above the  result of 
th e  relations o f finite to finite, relations th a t flow in to  one another, back and forth 
w ithou t end. H ow  foolish therefore to be  surprised  th a t w e are only creatures, 
or indeed  to  be frightened by it (323- 324).
I: The p re tensions and  desires o f m en  are odd enough. They w ould like to see w ith 
eyes alone, w ithou t light; and b e tte r still, they w ould like to see w ithout eyes. Only 
then , they think, w ould one see  properly, truly, and  naturally. W here th is kind of view 
prevails, th a t considers the  u n n a tu ra l as natural, and  the  na tura l as unnatura l, there  
is w hat is called ‘ph ilosophy .’ I rem em ber this question  being raised once in  a 
com pany  of people of d ifferent backgrounds: ‘ H ow  could the  h u m an  race have 
propagated  itself w ithout th e  occurrence of original s in ? ’ A w ise m an  quickly 
responded: ‘Oh, by m eans of rational d iscourse no d o u b t!’.
He: T hat’s splendid! But w h a t w ould com e of our rational discourses in  your opinion, 
if w e w ere to find ourselves, ju st as w e are, in a  w orld th a t resem bled the  legendary 
land of plenty by the  absence of all rules? (MPW, 324)
Jacobi’s point here, though somewhat masked by his over-the-top rhetoric, is 
actually fairly clear and quite sensible. By making ‘reason alone’, where reason 
is understood along the lines of the analytic-geometrical paradigm reviled by 
Jacobi, the ruling principle of hum an life and of society, one does indeed promote 
a type of rational self-governance. Jacobi’s point is that this type of self­
governance is hopelessly narrow. One’s actions and beliefs may well be internally 
consistent, but the im portant thing is what the goals or objects of our actions are. 
Jacobi observes that
... these  strivings can  b e  so restricted  th a t the  soul w ould b e  in a  position  to a tta in  its 
goals by m eans of its reason alone, i.e. th rough  its own self inasm uch  as it (the soul) 
has d istinct concepts. And if this sta te  of restriction  is the  Golden Age, th en  it m ight 
indeed  by achieved. (MPW, 326).
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In other words, if one abstracts away from the extra-rational factors that 
lend urgency and importance to the project of individual and collective reform 
espoused by the Enlightenment, then it is relatively easy to achieve rational co­
herence.
A parallel example might be found in the great advances made in formal logic 
during the early decades of the twentieth century. Once an abstract, formal no­
tation was devised for representing propositions at atomic inputs into com pu­
tational patterns, it became possible to derive more precise rules of inference and 
to devise complete axiomatic systems. But, as generations of frustrated symbolic 
logic students can attest, it is difficult to capture the nuances of a natural lan­
guage in such systems. Jacobi’s claim is that something similar happens when the 
analytic-geometrical paradigm is adopted as the guiding principle behind moral, 
religious, and political reform. One is forced to abstract away entirely from the 
complicated concerns, intuitions, sentiments, and motivations that lend import 
and urgency to such reformism in the first place.
For Jacobi, it is particularly troubling that the analytic-geometrical paradigm 
seems to rule out specifically religious aims and drives as legitimate (MPW, 327). 
On Jacobi’s view, such aims capture the highest aspirations of the hum an heart. 
After all, even Spinoza, for all the inexorable force of his deductions, must resort 
to the love of God in order to articulate the import of his system. Religious faith is 
not only not inferior or epistemically sub-par, according to Jacobi, it is also the 
expression of goals and interests that give meaning and purpose to hum an life. 
The formal requirements of a rational system can hardly function as satisfactory 
replacements for such goals and interests.
C o n c lu s io n
Does Jacobi have what it takes to be an irrationalist? A careful con­
sideration of his position m ust lead to a negative answer. First of all, Jacobi 
nowhere argues that a person ought to adopt views arbitrarily, or that we ought to 
accept inconsistent or implausible beliefs. But this silence is far from the end of 
the story. Jacobi provides a well-argued case for rejecting a paradigm of ration­
ality according to which anything short of apodictic certainty is epistemically 
sub-par. There is, therefore, no compelling reason for him  to accept the common 
understanding of the dichotomy between rationality and irrationality, the 
understanding that was urged upon him  by his contemporaries. Since Jacobi sees 
(to him, anyway) clear reasons for rejecting his contem poraries’ view on the 
nature of rationality, their charge, that he advocates irrationality, loses its force.
Even this, however, is not the end of the story, for Jacobi’s position is not 
merely a negative one. In place of the rejected analytic-geometrical paradigm, 
Jacobi outlines a more realistic, naturalistic account of reason. We are m eant 
to understand from Jacobi that hum an reason operates under conditions (most
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importantly, sensibility, which includes both sensation and sentiment), and that 
purely formal considerations cannot adequately substitute for these conditions. 
Furthermore, Jacobi clearly holds that these conditions are not merely unavoid­
able but unfortunate facts about hum an nature, nor are they idiosyncratic or 
arbitrary. Our com m on hum an nature (along with shared practices and tra­
ditions) constitute the indispensable context for the operation and application of 
reason to the actual world.
What does this view imply for religion? Can religion be situated within Jacobi’s 
conception of conditioned rationality in such a way that his famous advocacy of 
religious faith does not degenerate into irrationalism? Jacobi’s account of re­
ligious com m itm ent would certainly be irrationalist if (1) he held that we can and 
should adopt religious com m itm ents for no reason at all, or (2) despite over­
whelming reasons to refrain from adopting them. Jacobi clearly does not hold 
either view. On his view, religious com m itm ent is based upon our moral sensi­
bility. We find virtue attractive and vice repellent. We have moral aspirations, and 
we take pleasure in contemplating them  in ourselves and in others. This sensi­
bility m ust be cultivated. While he certainly could be clearer on this point, Jacobi 
nowhere denies rationality a role in this process of cultivation. Indeed, in his 
literary works, especially Edward A llw ill’s Collection o f Letters, Jacobi is quite 
critical of the Rousseauian cult of the Herzenmensch, the fantastical person of 
spontaneous natural feeling. Such a creature is, for Jacobi, just as m uch of a 
chimera as the being of pure reason that he ridicules in the D avid Hume.
Jacobi seems to be on quite solid ground on this point. It is eminently reason­
able to hold that the cultivation of our sensibilities depends upon their appli­
cation, particularly their application in making judgements. Unless there is 
something systematic to this process of cultivation, it is difficult to see how 
it could count as cultivation , rather than as blind, mechanical habituation. 
Jacobi’s remarks in the Spinoza Letters make it clear that, for him  anyway, 
the development of virtue requires deliberate effort and self-conscious reflection. 
He also insists that this process engenders an ever-deepening understanding 
of God, along with convictions of an explicitly religious nature. It is not that, 
on Jacobi’s view, one first adopts theism  willy-nilly, only later to make the 
happy discovery that one has made the correct choice. Instead of such a leap, 
Jacobi sketches a deliberate, controlled, and doubtless reasoned process of self­
cultivation.
Perhaps Jacobi is too optimistic about where this process will lead. Indeed, 
one might think that such optimism was more well-founded in the eighteenth 
century than it is today. Nevertheless, neither his account of religious com m it­
ment, nor his optimism about the outcome of self-cultivation, qualifies Jacobi as 
an irrationalist. Religious conviction is the product of reason, shaped and con­
ditioned by moral sensibility. As Newman famously puts it, ‘ Faith is the reason of 
a religious mind. ’18
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